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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes key variables and processes in France, the United
Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany in an attempt to determine the
factors unique to each nation that tend to inhibit or promote movement toward
integration of the European arms industries. For the purposes of this study it is
assumed that defense production costs will be constantly increasing, while a
variety of other global factors continue to produce a smaller arms market and
increased competition among suppliers. With these factors known, the political,
military, and economic roles of national arms industries are isolated as potential
indicators of future integration in Europe and the significance of a joint venture
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. SETTING THE STAGE
Over the past 10 years members of the international arms industrial
community have naturally established new forms of collaboration,
interdependence, and competition.* This has happened primarily as a response to
changing customer means and needs, the upwardly spiralling cost of developing
weapons systems, and the increase in the overall number of arms suppliers.
Much new ground has been broken, particularly among the European members
of this group. For instance, whereas past collaborative arms efforts involving
different European nations were characterized as ad hoc with little potential for
follow-on projects [Ref. l:p. 20], both the European Fighter Aircraft program
and the TRIGAT system program are managed by multi-national groups closely
related to consortia organized for similar programs in the late 1960's and early
1970's [Ref. 2:pp, 52, 56]. A degree of continuity is evident in both programs.
An increasing trend toward privatization is also evident in the European
arms market since 1979, leading to takeovers of smaller firms by those with
more capital. British Aerospace/Royal Ordnance and Daimler-
Benz/Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm are relationships that fall into this
For a more complete overview of the European arms industrial
community, see William Walker and Philip Gummett, "Britain and the European
Armaments Market," International Affairs, Summer 1989, pp. 419-42: Andrew
Moravcsik. "The European Armaments Industry at the Crossroads." Survival.
January/February 1990, pp. 65-85.
category. Even more significant is the transnational nature of some of these
takeovers, as with the GEC/Siemens move to take over Plessey in 1989.
The pace of such mergers and related events that potentially affect the future
shape of the European arms industry seems to be increasing as the European
Community heads toward the internal market of 1992. An all-encompassing,
quantifiable method to measure the amount of arms industrial integration
resulting from these particular events would greatly assist strategic planners
charged with mapping future U.S. policy toward Europe. With such a method
planners would be able to assess the progress and prospects of such endeavors.
For the purposes of this study the integration of the European arms industry
will be defined as the transformation of the national character of the European
armaments industries into a regional one, manifested by well-established
consortia undertaking major programs and by other permanent transnational
support infrastructures. Though the rise in the frequency of collaborative
projects among different European firms is an indication of the increased ease of
(or need for) cooperation, merely counting the number of joint ventures
undertaken per year will not result in a better understanding of the extent of
industry integration. Three general aspects of such ventures need to be taken into
account: the national processes of the different participants, especially those that
affect arms transfers; the type of venture being undertaken, including its relative
technological, national, and strategic importance; and the global environment
within which the venture is proceeding (see Figure 1).
National processes may be defined as the set of unique national factors that
help to determine how a specific country exploits its armaments industries as
political, security, and economic tools. Knowledge of these processes miy
inform judgments about which factors may hinder or further the integration
process. A given venture might meet some criteria for helping to promote
integration, but certain national factors may pose insurmountable difficulties.



















Figure 1. The Integration Testing Process
The transfer of arms includes both bullets and tanks, both accessories and jet
aircraft. Such a wide-ranging industry cannot be characterized by the traits of
just one of its weapons, but a certain hierarchy does exist among the different
systems a nation might produce, and the more important products do seem to
dominate the industry. Two of the predominant areas in the arms industries of
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Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany are aerospace and
electronic/telecommunications.
Common to both aerospace and electronics/telecommunications and the
whole arms industry has been a dramatic and constant increase in both the cost of
and time of development of a weapons system. As these rise a generalization
regarding the effect of the different types of arms ventures on integration can be
made. For any government, the higher the cost of a given venture and the
longer the time of development of a particular weapons system, the greater the
risk involved in undertaking such a venture alone. For the purpose of this
analysis it is perfectly reasonable to assume a continuous increase in the cost and
time aspects of weapons development, thus the constant applicability of this
generalization (see Figure 2).
The global environment includes everything that affects one nation's actions
toward another. Potentially every event that has economic, political, and security
implications for a nation can affect its arms industry. Over a period of time a
trend analysis of certain types of events may uncover a relationship between an
area of activity and arms integration. Prices of a natural resource like oil.
principally because of the amount of revenue it may provide a weapons
consumer. will tend to affect world arms exports. Its analysis over time may


















Figure 2. Weapons Type Generalization
Armed conflicts in different regions of the world might also influence the
amount of collaboration between Western European arms makers as well,
because such conflicts affect the available market for arms. The relationships the
different arms producing nations may have with the antagonists help to
determine whether exports will increase as a consequence of the conflict. When
an arms-producing nation has a traditional influence on a belligerent, it may
result in increased arms sales. Increased arms sales may allow an arn,, ndustry
to continue to pursue purely national interests at the expense of integration with
other European states.
In fact, any aspect of the global pcture that affects arms exports in Western
Europe will tend to influence national attitudes toward arms integration as well.
Unlike the United States, whose domestic market is capale of supporting even
the most ambitious of national goals concerning a defense-industrial base.
European nations cannot independently provide the support needed to keep the
national arms industries in business. The only alternatives to losing the domestic
capability to produce state-of-the-art weaponry are to subsidize the arms
industries at the expense of both other national programs and the overall quality
of life among the citizenry or to find an additional market in which to raise the
revenue necessary for maintaining the industry afloat and prosperous. The latter
maybe the only practical alternative in a peacetime democracy.
Experts in arms transfer trend analysis predict a continued contraction of the
arms export business through the next decade [Ref 3:p. 2; 4:p. 519]. Assuming a
constant or declining trend in arms exports a reasonable generalization
concerning the effect of the global environment on European arms integration is
that the net effect of the future global environment will be to lessen arms
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Figure 3. Global Environment Generalization
This thesis analyzes the national processes of France, the United Kingdom.
and the Federal Republic of Germany in an attempt to determine the factors
unique to each nation that tend to inhibit or promote movement toward
intc.,ration of the European arms industries. Since the cross characteristi, of
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the type of venture (constantly increasing costs) and the global environment (a
smaller arms market and increased competition) are known, these effects of
national processes may be among the key indicators of the contribution toward
integration of any particular venture. In theory, if these gross characteristics
were clearly understood and their relative importance in specific cases could be
identified, the significance of a joint venture involving France, Britain, or the
Federal Republic of Germany for progress toward arms integration could be
judged with greater confidence.
B. TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG NATO ARMS
PRODUCERS
As Andrew Moravcsik points out, a nation has four options for procuring
major weapons systems. First, a nation may import weapons from abroad.
Second, a nation may produce weapons under a foreign license (co-production).
Third. a country can design and produce weapons in cooperation with foreign
nations (co-development). Lastly, a country can choose to design and produce its
own weapons systems.[Ref. 5:p. 65]
Over the years this has led to three distinct patterns of relationships in the
area of weapons production among the major West European arms
manufacturers. Weapons production is either accomplished domestically, in
conjunction with the other European manufacturers, or in conjunction with the
United States. The development and endurance of these relationships has been a
function of both the role of NATO in national strategies and the lack of an
integrated market in Europe, two of the several factors that have promoted an
imbalance in the arms trade between West European nations and the United
States [Ref. 6:p. 481.
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While the role of NATO has continually evolved over its 40 years as an
organization, reflecting the shifts that naturally occur as governments change or
as economies grow and decline, until the last decade there has been no evidence
of a fundamental shift away from its basic premise: the role of the Alliance is to
deter aggression and defend Western security, if necessary [Ref. 7:pp. 13-16].
Recently, several issues have been raised that may threaten this basic premise.
These include changed perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons, the issue of
burden-sharing, and the changing perceptions of the Soviet threat.
Nuclear weapons have played an important part in NATO strategy but have
also been the source of much controversy. Specifically, the American approach
to such subjects as theater nuclear force modernization, the Strategic Defense
Initiative, and the INF Treaty has caused some Europeans to question the long-
term reliability of the American nuclear umbrella [Ref. 8:p. 36]. If the nuclear
guarantee could not be counted on, a fundamental premise behind NATO would
be invalidated, changing the relationships between all members.
The burdensharing issue has been present since the foundation of NATO, but
the economic strength of the non-U.S. members of NATO has increased relative
to that of the United States in recent decades, so these members are in a position
to increase their share of the burden of the defense of Europe. How much and in
what form this increase should be has been a source of contention for the last
several years [Ref. 9:pp. 9-151.
The perception of the Soviet threat has changed fundamentally during the
Gorbachev era. Promises of unilateral force withdrawals made in December
1988 by Gorbachev and the collapse of Communist authority in much of Eastern
Europe in late 1989 have served to fuel the controversy, with the result that
9
members of the Alliance have different views of the threat [Ref. 10:pp. 33-36].
The most recent events surrounding Eastern Europe indicate the need for
another threat assessment, taking into account the newly-formed democracies. A
fundamental change in NATO is bound to occur as a result.
Another factor whose constancy has helped to maintain the traditional
relationships between the arms producers of NATO has been the lack of an
integrated European market. As with the NATO role, this too has been changing.
In fact, since 1985 formal plans have existed to create a truly border-free
internal market in the European Community by 1992 [Ref. l1:p. 75].
Throughout this market trade barriers would be lowered as an integrated
European market comparable in size to the United States emerged. As a result,
the basic relationship between the U.S. and Europe would change, even though
the 1992 initiative does not specifically include the defense industry [Ref. 121."
As noted above, the consistent role of NATO in national strategies and the
lack of an integrated European market have resulted in basically constant
relationships between the United States and major weapons-producing European
nations up until the last ten years. These traditional relationships, in turn, have
caused traditional obstacles to the integration of the European arms industries to
remain valid through the years. The question, then, is whether the traditional
obstacles to European arms integration are still valid as a result of events of the
past decade? If not, what has taken their place?
For an overview of the potential effect of the 1992 initiative on the Unitcd
States, see Business VWeek, 12 December 1988 issue; Defense News. 22 Januar\
199( ISSLIC.
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C. TRADITIONAL OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION
Before presenting a framework for estimating the extent of integration of the
Western European defense industry, one basic question needs to be considered:
are there valid, impassable obstacles to the integration of the defense industry in
Western Europe? Finding such a hindrance would simplify the issue and allow
strategic planners to nullify the effects of a unified European defense market in
any future U.S. strategic plans. On the other hand, if it can be reasonably shown
that such obstructions no longer exist, the problem of recognizing the trend
toward defense industry integration in Europe, measuring it, and finally
anticipating future steps of the process becomes worthy of study.
Traditionally, obstacles to the integration of the European defense industry
have fallen into three general categories: national prestige, national economics,
or national security. In the area of national prestige, an independent arms
industry provided diplomatic flexibility to the makers of foreign policy as well
as a perception of greater power among nations. In the area of national
economics, expenditures by a government for arms and munitions, if spent
within the nation's borders, would provide jobs and be a source of government
revenue (taxation and export-stimulus). Finally, in the area of national security.
an arms industry provided a domestic source of munitions to the armed forces.
How a sovereign nation chooses to procure the weapons it deems necessary to
support its chosen foreign policy affects that policy in many ways more
dramatically than what weapons it procures. Traditionally, the degree of
autonomy a nation enjoyed in carrying out the full range of diplomatic options
was a function of its interdependence with other nations and the perceived power
credited to it. A high degree of independence in the area of arms procurement
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resulted in a greater amount of national prestige and higher diplomatic flexibility
in the international arena.
Two separate factors in modern international politics and security policy
have combined to lower the diplomatic value of an independent arms
procurement policy: nuclear weapons and the rising cost of technology. These
in turn have contributed to an increased emphasis on the economic aspect of arms
procurement and collective defense efforts in general. Th s has been particularly
evident in Western Europe.
The advent of nuclear weapons has caused a new light to be shed on how
nations deal with each other. Since the end of World War II the world has been
divided between those nations possessing nuclear weapons and those nations that
do not. The power derived from possessing nuclear weapons is never so
apparent as when dealing with a nation not having that capability, and this
generally adds to the breadth of options a nation enjoys along traditional lines of
diplomacy. As General Charles de Gaulle stated in 1961, "a great state that does
not possess [nuclear weapons] while others do is not the master of its destiny."
[Ref. 13:p. 23]
In relations between two countries, the traditional value of arm-,
independence is not seriously affected by nuclear weapons when neither side has
them. When both nations possess nuclear weapons, however, the traditional
value of arms procurement independence is altered most dramatically. Rather
than a buildup of nuclear weaponry achieving greater diplomatic flexibility, the
rise of the destructive potential of a nation's arsenal is so potentially catastrophic
that it lessens the propensity to go to war in order to solve political disputes.
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It is evident that the possession of nuclear weapons or formal ties to nations
with nuclear weapons is necessary in order to avoid being in a disadvantageous
position vis-a-vis a nation having them. France chose to develop her own
independent nuclear force, Great Britain has a force maintained with assistance
from the United States, while other European nations such as the Federal
Republic of Germany have settled for the United States' nuclear guarantee under
the auspices of NATO. In any case, once a nation has one of these nuclear
prerequisites, the diplomatic value of arms procurement independence once again
increases, but the rise in the cost of technology necessary for modem weapons
production places its own constraint on procurement policies.
To illustrate this rising cost, in 1955 the United States spent approximately 7
billion dollars to procure 1400 military aircraft (1982 dollars). In 1982, 14
billion dollars were spent to buy 200 aircraft [Ref. 14:p. 7]. The oft-repeated
price of a B-2 bomber is 500 million dollars per aircraft. The rising cost of
technology has forced a reevaluation of arms procurement policies within each
nation.
Just as the diplomatic value of arms procurement independence to a modem
nation has been diluted due to nuclear weapons and the rising cost of technology.
the economic aspects of collective defense have increased in importance due to
the same factors. Specifically, the complexity of modern weapons systems
provides thousands of jobs at both the contractor and sub-contractor level, as
well as a significant return to the government due to taxes. Since the cost of
procuring weapons is a significant and controversial part of a nation's defense
budget. domestic production can be the overriding factor on whether a program
is funded.
13
Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, the agreement establishing the European
Community in 1957, exempts defense related industry from EC controls [Ref.
15:p.]. However, the face of the European economy has been changing as the
continent prepares for the coming of the internal market in 1992. The
acceptance of an internal European market is a basic step toward a transnational
approach toward economics, which many experts feel is bound to spillover to
defense issues [Ref. 16:p. 43; 17:p. 1044]. At the very least an increase in
nationalistic tendencies in arms procurement would be contrary to the economic
trends in Europe as a whole.*
Historically, nations have used domestic arms production as the major means
of supplying their armed forces. Between 1985 and 1989, for instance, France
procured 80% of her major weapons systems domestically, the United Kingdom
75%, and the Federal Republic of Germany 45% (with an additional 20% from
co-production) [Ref. 5:p. 66]. But does this imply that domestic production is
necessary for security reasons? In looking at the development and continued
refinement of the concept of collective defense as it applies to Western Europe,
nothing points to the maintenance of a domestic arms industry for the sake of
national security less than NATO.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in April
1949. The signatory nations were "resolved to unite their efforts for collective
defence and for the preservation of peace and security."[Ref. 7:p. 13] Needing to
For a more complete treatment of the 1992 issue, see Anthony Hartley,
"After 1992: Multiple Choice," The National Interest. Spring 1989: for a
guideline on procurement plans, see Towards a Stronger Europe. v. 1.
Independent European Programme Group, December 1986.
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face an aggressive Soviet empire to the east, war-weary Western European
nations joined with the United States and Canada in an alliance in which member
states committed their armed forces to the defense of the whole.
From its very beginning NATO's muscle was the military and economic
strength of the United States. The United States guaranteed a nuclear and
conventional presence to her West European allies that, in 1949 and years to
come, no other member could match. Reliance on the United States was the most
effective as well as the most efficient means to achieve typical security goals:
prevention of attack by an enemy who, without the U.S. to consider, would have
an overwhelming correlation of force advantage; in case of invasion, an
assurance of support from the strongest possible ally; and protection against
nuclear blackmail.
In its ideal state, NATO is a collection of sovereign nations who willingly'
structure their defense posture around the needs of the Alliance. In order to
form a strong, cohesive alliance with maximum efficiency, it would seem logical
that member nations contribute to the Alliance according to their strengths. The
most efficient arms producers would supply weapons to the other members of
the Alliance, who would contribute according to their own strength. Collective
defense would only be taken to this extreme if the only concern of the Alliance
was security, with political and economic issues discounted. In theory the
approach to defense embodied in NATO, collective defense, would be most
effective if the responsibility for making weapons is given to the most efficient
producers regardless of national concerns.
In reality, weapons production does not completely follow the most-efficient-
producer principle, though it has led to dominance by the biggcr members of the
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Alliance: France, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and, of course, the
United States. These three European members of NATO account for roughly
75% of the defense spending in NATO Europe, though the United States
produces more of some types of weapons systems than all other NATO allies
combined [Ref. 18:p. 107]. As a result, the European arms industry can be
considered a reflection of the three nations who control most of it: France,
Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany. This reasonable assumption is
based on the idea that no real movement toward integration could take place
without the involvement of these three nations.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
If obstacles to European arms production integration are either removed or
replaced, the United States will be affected in at least three areas. If an
integrated European defense market emerges, the U.S. defense industry will be
faced with having to deal for the first time with a foreign partner of equal size;
and many of the comparative advantages that go with a size advantage (longer
production runs, broader R&D base) would no longer exist. The attractiveness
of an American partner would not be as obvious as it once was, and the resulting
decrease in cooperative ventures could affect the U.S. ability to maintain a
complete defense-industrial base.
A second area affected by an integrated European arms market would be
U.S. foreign military sales. The same advantages that are beneficial when
dealing with a foreign partner in a joint venture are often the major selling
points for a weapons system to a foreign government since the), result in a lower
unit price for the weapon. When the European rival has negated that advantage.
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the relatively restrictive arms export policy of the United States government may
well put the U.S. at a disadvantage in the international arms market.
U.S. defense policy would also be affected by an integrated European arms
market. For one thing, an integrated market would surely mean closer ties
among the European countries, perhaps resulting in a true European pillar. Not
only would the United States have to look to Europe as an equal, the United
States' presence in Europe would be much less needed for security or stability,
allowing an American shift in security emphasis toward the Pacific [Ref. 19:p.
ii I.
In an age of shrinking arms markets, increasing costs of weapons, and ever-
tightening defense budgets, it is imperative to have accurate indicators of defense
market trends. With the potential effect of the recent changes in Europe on the
shape of the arms industry, this is especially true in Europe.
E. THEORY OF EUROPEAN ARMS INTEGRATION WITH
RESPECT TO NATIONAL PROCESSES
It is possible to identify three types of national processes when examining the
potential of arms integration in Europe: processes that hinder, processes that
help, and conditional processes. Processes that hinder have characteristics which
frustrate efforts toward arms integration independent of any outside influence.
If France, Britain, or the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, had a
national strategy that called for a unique weapons system mix, that nation's
strategic policy would hinder efforts at integration under any circumstances.
At the other end of the spectrum are processes that help the move toward
integration irregardless of the condition. A national procurement plan that is
based on acquiring weapons at the lowest price with no national preference is an
17
example of a process that should, in theory at least, promote integration in all
cases.
Conditional processes either help or hinder the integrative process depending
on other aspects of the venture, including other processes involved, the type of
venture, and the global environment. Though complex and elusive, conditional
national processes are perhaps the most numerous type. The difficulty of
recognizing the conditional type of process is made m ich easier if the non-
process aspects can be identified.
When dealing with European arms industry integration it has already been
determined that a valid generalization is reasonable for the non-process variables
of types of ventures and global environment. Major ventures are becoming
costlier and taking longer to reach fruition, and are therefore continually getting
riskier. The global environment affects the integration effort through its effect
on arms exports, which will probably continue to decline over the next decade.
Using the plausible assumptions of ventures getting riskier and exports
continuing to decrease, recognizing the effect toward integration of a particular
French, British, or German process becomes possible.
Stated simply, this theory of measuring arms integration involves two steps.
First, for a given arms event (joint venture, announced sale, merger or
acquisition, government policy decision, etc.) the general reason for a country's
involvement in that event (political tool, security tool, or economic tool) must be
chosen. A multi-faceted deal maybe explained by more than one reason, but an
attempt to focus on the underlying motivations on the part of France, Britain.
and the Federal Republic may permit a more perceptive analysis. If more than
18
one reason is to be considered, each analysis can be done separately, with
comparison of the different results weighted toward the more significant.
Once the primary reason for French, British, or German involvement is
isolated, it becomes necessary to filter it through the aspects of that particular
type of venture as well as the global environment. Both of these variables, as
previously argued, can be generalized and considered constant for heuristic
analytical purposes. The value of the filtration mechanism is its labeling of an
otherwise conditional process. The net result is a valid characterization for a
particular event involving France, Britain, or the Federal Republic of Germany
as either a hindrance toward European arms integration or a help toward its
fruition. As an example, assume France and West Germany were contemplating
collaboration on a new generation of main battle tank. The primary reasons for
producing the tank could be quite different for each nation, France for its export
potential (economical) and West Germany for its use on the Central Front
(security).
Because of the rising cost of ventures, this effort would seem to naturally
promote integration. However, the underlying reasons for collaborating are
affected differently by the global environment filter, which reflects the lowerinI
potential for arms exports, which reflects the lowering potential for arms
exports. Though West German desires might be unaffected and still reflect
collaboration, the reasons would succeed and promote integration, French efforts
would be affected by this filter and the arms event would hinder integration.
The pictorial representation of this process is captured in Figure 4.
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F. NATIONAL PROCESSES AFFECTING ARMS PRODUCTION IN
FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, AND
THE UNITED KINGDOM
A national government has a vested interest in the arms industry within its
borders encompassing much more than the design, production, and sale of its
products. On the one hand, like any other business that employs large numbers
of citizens, a national government has a general interest in the health of the
industry. Several aspects of the arms industry combine to make it unique,
however. A nation's arms industry can be utilized as a political tool, a security
tool, and an economic tool by those in power.
1. The Potential of the Arms Industry as a Political Tool
The use of a nation's arms industry as a political tool can affect domestic
issues as well as foreign policy objectives. The N-,' poitcal party striving for
election promises to use the arms in'.tuy as a way to provide jobs once placed
in power, the size of the votin ' bloc represented by the arms industry, and the
importance of strategic independence in a party's campaign platform can indicate
the importance placed on strong government involvement in the industry.
2
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Figure 4. The Integration Testing Model
In a nation with an established arms industry, a certain amount of
political influence on the part of industrial leaders can be assumed. When the
level of influence is high, perhaps as a result of campaign contributions or due to
an organized lobby, the arms industry becomes more than a passive political tool,
it becomes a political force. Its influence on domestic issues then is more
significant, more public, and more of a consideration in the making of policy.
This means, for example, that the arms industrialists could be included in the
national policy making process.
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As a political tool, a nation's arms industry can be used to support its
foreign policy objectives. As a way for allowing strategic independence, an arms
industry may provide negotiating leverage in a nation's dealings with another
power. If dependent on another nation for something as important as arms and
munitions, a country may be hard-pressed (depending on other specific factors in
its circumstances) to negotiate fair trade agreements on foodstuffs, raw
materials, or finished products. Attempts to sway international opinion may be
less successful, and it may have fewer options for dealing with regional disputes.
The use of arms as an export also provides an opportunity for a nation
to establish influence with countries not having an arms-making capability.
Becoming another country's supplier of arms can create an infrastructure oil
which a deeper relationship may be built, one which otherwise may not be
possible. If relations with a developing nation are desired by an arms-producing
nation, an ability to export weaponry may be significant.
2. The Potential of the Arms Industry as a Security Tool
The diplomatic value of having a national arms industry has been
discussed previously, both the aspects of international perceptions and actual
independence. A complete or partially complete defense-industrial base is also
important in national mobilization planning. If allies are closely entwined, each
with different roles in the alliance, the importance of a specific nation's arms
production depends on its role. If its contribution to the coalition is based on the
supplying of arms, any move to weaken its national arms base would make its
contribution less valuable.
By its continued contribution of a strong defense-industrial base to a
coalition, a naution might find that its arms industry functions as an effective
alliance stabilizer. In such a case, a movement toward transnational
consolidation might tend to disrupt certain political relationships within the
alliance, and the implications of this disruption could be significant. Though the
establishment of a transnational defense indusuy could be just as stabilizing in the
long run, its initial effects could be far-reaching.
Mobilization and alliance issues aside, a national armaments base allows
for more independent action on the part of a sovereign nation. In the matter of
national security, the knowledge that it need not rely on another nation for arms
may result in fewer constraints in dealing with rivals and allies alike. The net
result may be a foreign policy that more explicitly reflects the national interest
and a clearer national strategy.
3. The Potential of the Arms Industry as an Economic Tool
Certain parts of the arms industry are also economically significant.
Weapons exports, for example, can provide the government an opportunity for
political influence, a means of earning hard currency, and a contribution to
maintaining a broad defense-industrial base.
Another national statistic of economic importance is employment. The
number of jobs the industry provides the nation has been shown to be of political
value, but in economic terms it can also be significant. Just as the), can form a
large voting bloc, employees of the nation's arms industry can comprise a large
shopping bloc. Because of skill specialization, many employed in the arms
industry cannot cross over into other industries without additional training. This
1os, uf clfi.iency may only be temporary, but a weakening of the arms industry
might have lone-term effects in the number of techni.ally trained individuals
available to all of industry'.
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This last point dealing with trained personnel also has a parallel in the
area of technology. Technological advances are made as a result of an active
research and development effort on the part of a nation. In some countries, a
healthy armaments industry has an important effect on the size of the national
research and development base. Weakening that industry may have the long-
term effect of shrinking that base, perhaps with no national substitute, depending
on the character of the country's national research and de'. elopment policy.
A strong research and development effort also results in an increased
number of spinoffs to the private sector. These spinoffs may allow the private
sector to compete internationally. A technological spinoff initiated by the arms
industry that results in a comparative advantage in the international private
market increases the hidden value of arms research and development. The
increasingly dual use aspect of modern technology only accelerates this trend.
The extent to which France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal
Republic of Germany make use of these potential tools is a function of the
political process, leadership choices, the relationship between government and
industry, and the national strategy of each country. Each of these factors is
analyzed in the next three chapters to determine what elements of the national
approach to the arms industry may tend to hinder or promote European arms
integration. The ability and willingness of each nation to limit its use of policy
mechanisms which hinder European arms integration or expand the use of
arrangements which aid the integration process may become important indicators
of the likelihood of progress in integration.
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II. THE FRENCH ARMS INDUSTRY
A. OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY
Traditionally, the armaments industry has been an important instrument of
France's national strategy. In order to maintain its position as a world power
France has felt it necessary to maintain a strong, diverse armaments industrial
base [Ref. 20:p. 1]. With this need as its major justification the French
armaments industry has come to be characterized by many factors revolving
around one central concept: the preeminent role of the State.
The French government exerts influence over the armaments industry in a
variety of ways: indirect control by very centralized support institutions, direct
control through sole or majority ownership in major corporations, and as the
purchaser of approximately 40% of the weapons production. An example of a
centralized support institution is the Delegation Generale Pour l'Armement
(DGA) whose aim, according to Jean-Francois Briand, executive Vice President
of Thomson-CSF, "has been self sufficiency in major strategic defense arenas"
using both public and private French companies [Ref. 21:p. 23]. Thomson-CSF
is an example of a nationalized conglomerate directly influenced by government
policy.
The French government controls the procurement of weapons systems by the
French armed forces. In a recent example, the French navy, faced with the
prospect of retiring its fleet of F-8E (FN) Crusader aircraft in 1993 without an
available replacement from the French inventory (the naval version of the Rafale
is intended to reach the fleet in 1998), lobbied aggressively for the procuremenT
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of 15 second hand McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 aircraft from the US Navy,
arguing that this approach was the only acceptable way of meeting its
requirements of air cover for its two aircraft carriers. As stated by the French
Navy's deputy chief of naval operations, Vice Admiral Yves Goupil, "We only
need the F/A-18 for five years, and we'd then replace it with the Rafale." [Ref.
22:p. 4]
The decision, however, has been made to refurbish the aging Crusaders (with
safety as the main refurbishmen objective) rather than to purchase the American
F/A-18s. With an eye toward the export market, a senior defense ministry
official stated, "If the French Navy had bought the F/A-18, it would have given
[McDonnell Douglas] a very significant marketing edge over Dassault [builder of
the Rafalel in future foreign sales." [Ref. 22:p. 4] Citing the success of the
Rafale program as a national challenge, French defense minister Jean-Pierre
Chevenement called the maintenance of a competitive French aeronautical
indutry "part of the defense of France." [Ref. 23:p. 16]
The structure of the arms industry is very unique and original.*
Specifically, the many nationalized industries such as Aerospatiale, Thomson-
CSF, and SNECMA (Societe Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs
d'Aviation) coexist with some 3500 private companies of all sizes, the largest of
which are Dassault and Matra [Ref. 24:p. 187]. Over the years in the aerospace
industry, for instance, different mergers and acquisitions resulted in the forming
of Aerospatiale in 1970 and Dassault-Bregeut in 1971 [Ref. 25:p. 18]. Dassault is
" For a complete treatment of the French arms industry, see Chapters 3 and
4, Kolodziej, 1'. A.. Making and Alarketin,, Arms: the French Experience and itS
Iiplic'ations.for the International Systems. Princeton University Press, 1 S7.
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a family-run company specializing in fighter aircraft. The French government
owns 40% of the shares and thereby controls voting at annual meetings due to the
government's double voting rights [Ref 2 6 :p. A10]. However, the Dassault
family owns the majority of shares and Serge Dassault is chairman. Matra is a
defense and electronics firm whose 50.97% interest owned by the government
was sold to the public in January 1988 as part of Finance Minister Edouard
Balladur's policy of denationalization of state assets [Ref. 27:p. 25].
Aerospatiale is a state-owned aerospace corporation with a broad base of
commercial interests. It controls smaller organizations in supporting industries--
for instance, three sub-companies in the area of electronics support its role as an
aircraft manufacturer: SFENA deals with flight control and navigation, EAS
with radiocommunications, and Crouzet with a large variety of aeronautical
needs. Its top executives are chosen by the government, so the positions entail a
direct political aspect not seen in the United States.
The Groupement Industriel des Armaments Terrestres (GIAT) is the
industrial arm of the government organization tasked with testing and
manufacturing ground combat equipment, the Direction des Armements
Terrestres (DAT). The equipment it produces ranges from hand-held weapons
to main battle tanks. Giat is an example of an organization beset with all the
problems of inefficiency common to a government-run monopoly. Recently this
has caused the government to make changes in its administration [Ref. 28:p. 81.
As Jeffrey Clarke has noted, France's current military-industrial partnership
dates from 1936, when legislation gave the state the authority to nationalize
certain private arms-producing industries. The way in which the state could do
this was via outright annexation of a firm, resulting in direct control. or b\
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purchase of a percentage of stock in the company [Ref 29:p. 46]. Recognizing
the need to compete with more industrially powerful rivals, France sought a
centrally controlled arms industry that did not inhibit the spirit of free
enterprise. The present defense-industrial complex in France reflects this
through its centralized procurement policies, the embodiment of which is the
DGA.
The DGA is responsible for weapons development and procurement for all
three French services, and is answerable directly to the defense minister, not the
armed services. The staff of 25,000 includes about 1000 military officers whose
careers are not endangered as a result of opposing a weapon system favored by a
particular service. As Francois Heisbourg, director of the International Institute
for Strategic Studies and a former French arms official, states, "[Military
officers in the DGA] are inter-service and inter-service all their lives and so have
no fear of saying no to a new tank and going back to the army three years later
to face a firing squad." [Ref. 30:p. 30]
Frequent complaints are levied against the DGA. In the view of some arms
industrialists, the fact that the DGA is staffed mostly by bureaucrats and not by
people who know the workings of a company often results in unreasonable
demands placed on industry. In the view of some in the armed forces, the same
attribute may result in an inferior weapon. In the view of some potential foreign
buyers, the DGA system has effectively killed competition in the French arms
industry, resulting in predictable products. The concentration of power in the
DGA also requires a forceful defense minister in order to keep it in line [Ref.
30:p. 301.
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Despite these alleged shortcomings, this centralized control seems to have
served France well since the DGA was created in 1961 by Charles de Gaulle. In
the words of a former DGA official,
The fact that France has had the DGA has enabled us as a medium-size
country with a limited defense budget to develop a coherent, effective,
efficient nuclear and conventional defense industry second only to the U.S.
within the Western alliance. If we had wasted our resources for the past 25
years we would never have been able to do it. [Ref. 30:p. 30]
The DGA has directed weapons procurement from France's nationalized defense
industrial base. Its powerful role in the French arms procurement cycle ensures
that it will have a prominent position in a more Europeanized cycle.
B. FRENCH ARMS AS A POLITICAL TOOL
French politicians have frequently called attention to France's position as a
great and independent world power. In the 45 years since the end of World War
11 appeals to national grandeur have had greater resonance with the public in
France than with the publics in either the Federal Republic of Germany or the
United Kingdom. The French strategic style can be characterized by a
preoccupation with considerations of Great Power status. As stated by President
Mitterrand in May 1989, one of the three instruments used to support the
resulting strategy of independence and status is the national industries [Ref. 31 :p.
8.
Though most often seen as an essential element of traditional Gaullist
security policy, a capable military-industrial establishment is also important in
domestic politics and economics. Most specifically, the large defense-industrial
complex provides many jobs for Frenchmen, The French armaments industry
accounts for approximately 280,000 jobs, representing 3.6% of the total national
workforce [Ref. 24:p. 187].
This fact has two implications for governmental leaders. First, the workers
in the armaments industry represent a large voting bloc, one which needs to be
taken into account when formulating policy. Second, disruptions in an industry
with so many workers could have national economic ramifications, causing a rise
in unemployment and inflation. These considerations may constrain the national
leadership in carrying out needed reforms in state-run firms. The state-run
GIAT is a case in point. The prospect of rising unemployment has limited the
changes made by the government to lessen inefficiencies in the GIAT
organization [Ref. 32:p. 13].
The political inflt,-r" t, wielded by industrial leaders varies, depending on
both the product -., sented and the personal charisma of the industrialist, as
well as the arnount of state control wielded in their businesses. For instance,
Marcel Passault, the late founder of the company bearing his name, was so
influential that it was said that his company chose which fighter jets France
would develop, not the government [Ref. 33:p. A121. Today Dassault-Breguet is
still France's only maker of fighter jets, but under the leadership of Marcel's son
Serge the firm has become much more dependent on the decisions of politicians.
When made chairman of the firm in October 1986 six of the board members,
those appointed by the government, abstained rather than vote for his election,
not voting against him only because the Defense Ministry wanted to avoid open
battle [Ref. 34:p. 361. Frustrating to the rest of the industry, the dominating
attitude of Dassault-Breguct has limited France's involvement in international
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projects and kept other French firms from being sub-contractors for European-
wide fighter projects like the European Fighter Aircraft [Ref. 33:p. A12].
Because of the level of state involvement, however, some potentially
influential industry executives are rather muted. Alain Gomez, for example, as
head of Thomson S.A., a giant arms and consumer electronics firm, had been a
political appointee as a former Socialist Party activist. His base of support
eroded as he became too independent-minded to please the various political
power centers [Ref. 3 5 :p. A91.
Though not taking into account such things as industrialist charisma three
steps cited by Defense Minister Andre Giraud in 1987 seem to indicate the
relative position of arms industrialists: governments define the alliances and
policies; the armed service chiefs define the military requirements, and industries
play the key role in producing for the markets thus defined [Ref. 36:p. 321.
Industrial policy is dependent on national policy, but the lack of clear
national support does not paralyze the industry. A good example seems to be the
reaction to the American Strategic Defense Initiative. The cornerstone of French
defense policy over the last 25 years has been nuclear deterrence, and concern
for the devaluation of such a policy due to SDI (and other considerations)
prevented the French leadership from offering full support to the project.
Though Gaullist Prime Minister Jacques Chirac called SDI a "great, inevitable,
irreversible, and justified movement", he refused to sign an agreement with the
United States which would facilitate the granting of research contracts to French
firms [Ref. 37:p. 241.
As a result, firms anxious to earn SDI money did it without government
support. The SDI manager for Matra, in describing tile steps needed to achieve
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an SDI research contract worth $508,000 in October 1986, said "We had to clear
all the obstacles, including [official] French indifference." [Ref. 38:p. 40]
Further movement by industry without pushing by the government seems to
be occurring with marketing strategies for the opening of the European internal
market in 1992. Though most areas of defense procurement are officially
exempt from the agreement signed in February 1986 known as the Single
European Act, the potential effect of a border free European Community has the
arms industry preparing for a wide range of options. In discussing joint
ventures in the defense related industries, Thomson-CSF Vice President Jean-
Francois Briand has urged, "Don't wait for government prompting to
cooperate." [Ref. 21:p. 23]
Recent French government activity in the area of mergers and acquisitions
seems to have lagged behind that of similar efforts in the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United Kingdom. Afte- Daimler-Benz announced plans to take
over Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm in the Federal Republic and British
Aerospace the takeover of Royal Ordnance in the United Kingdom, it was only a
matter of time before French industry got involved. At the end of November
1989 Aerospatiale and Thompson-CSF announced plans to combine efforts in the
area of flight electronics [Ref. 39:p. 34].
Traditionally, the French arms industry has been a tool of foreign policy
both within Europe and throughout the world. Within Europe, the autonomous
development of nuclear weapons was consistent with pronouncements regarding
France's intent to retain control over her national identity. France also used
cooperative ventures with foreign policy objectives in mind. In his study
concerning multinational development of large aircraft, Mark lorell nes that
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France used codevelopment projects with the Federal Republic of Germany as a
political strategy to place Germany in a position of subordination and as a way to
take the leadership of European projects without the involvement of the United
States [Ref 40:p. 10].
France has used the export of arms in those areas of traditional French
influence to offset the loss of leverage from the granting of independence to
former colonies. France continues to perform a stabilizing role in her former
colonies in Africa. Even though the economic incentives are less in that region
than others, for political reasons France protects its traditional role as an arms
supplier.*
Libya (6th), Algeria (13th), and Nigeria (16th) are the only central or
northern African nations (excluding Egypt, which is considered a Middle East
nation) which ranked among the twenty largest Third World arms importers
between 1982-86, and they accounted for only 7.8% of the total [Ref. 41:p. 2011.
During this same period France accounted for 15.1% of the total arms exports to
Third World nations, and its top five recipients of arms (Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
India, Argentina and Egypt) did not include any central or northern African
nation [Ref. 41:p. 193]. Thus, France's involvement in arms exports to this
region was of low economic utility relative to its political utility.
Three government agencies support the French defense industry in its export
efforts: the Compagnie Francaise d'Assistance Specialisee (COFRAS): the
Societe Francaise de Materiels dArmenent (SOFMA); and the Societe Francaist,
d'Exportation de Svstemes d'Arnzemnent (SOFRESA). COFRAS is a training
Sec- Kolodzicj. Chapters 5-7.
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organization established in 1972: its task is teaching foreign armies about French
arms. SOFMA, established in 1939, is the exporting agent of state-owned
establishments. It is made up of shareholders from within the defense industry.
SOFRESA was set up in 1974 to support French industry in exports to Africa
and the Middle East. It assists both state-owned and private manufacturers [Ref.
42:p. 189].
These organizations further consolidate the dominant role of the State in the
arms industry, but also create an official infrastructure with the potential to
represent France in a more transnational arms industry. In the final analysis,
however, the presence of these national organizations may hinder moves toward
permanent multi-national relationships, as they represent organizations whose
existence is based on a national character.
C. FRENCH ARMS AS A SECURITY TOOL
The most basic justification for a nation to develop and support an arms
industry is national security. France in the post-World War II era has developed
and maintained a nuclear and conventional weapons base sufficient to support a
global security policy. Through nuclear deterrence France has pursued a "no
war" strategy, but out-of-area interests in Africa, Indochina, the Middle East, the
Pacific and elsewhere have necessitated the maintenance of a wide range of
conventional forces as well.
France, with her independent nuclear deterrence posture, has not relied on
national mobilization capability in her strategy. An important reason for her
withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966 was French
insistence on an immediate nuclear response to Soviet aggression while the rest
of the alliance was moving toward the doctrine of flexible response, which
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emphasized the ability to respond to aggression with conventional forces as well
[Ref. 43:p. 476]. In 1982, Defense Minister Charles Hernu stated the French
logic of deterrence and the implicitly minimal role of mobilization: "One cannot
believe in deterrence and at the same time not believe in it, found one's defence
on nuclear weapons and prepare for conventional war." [Ref. 44:p. 14]
One result of this policy has been an underemphasis on stocks of munitions
and equipment over the years, for both active and reserve forces. This, in turn,
has made a complete defense industrial base for the purpose of national
mobilization less important than for other purposes. The formation in 1983 of a
Force d'Action Rapide (FAR) and the reorganization of the French army that
year have been viewed as proof of increased emphasis on conventional capability,
and protocols signed in January 1988 set up a Franco-German defense council to
discuss common defense issues as proof of increased French involvement in the
common defense [Ref. 45:p. 29].
At the same time a renewed emphasis on conventional capability may signal
an increase in the need for a complete defense-industrial base for the purpose of
mobilization, the increased role in NATO represented by this newly emphasized
capability indicates greater French willingness to recognize interdependence in
security matters. As a result, an independent defense-industrial base may become
less important.
D. FRENCH ARMS AS AN ECONOMIC TOOL
The French arms industry is a significant economic tool for the nation in the
areas of exports, employment, and technology. In the resource-constrained area
of French military procurement exports are essential to maintaining domestic
armn,-producing capability, a basic element of traditional French policy. The,,c
industries, in turn, provide constant employment to a large number of
Frenchmen. Military research and development efforts account for a large
percentage of the overall national research effort, (21%) less than the United
Kingdom (28%) but greater than the Federal Republic of Germany (40%) [Ref.
46:p. 303].
For the 5 year period 1984-1988 France was the third leading exporter of
arms in the world, behind only the Soviet Union and the United States. During
this time France exported over 17.9 billion dollars worth (1985 prices) of arms,
14.7 billion dollars worth to Third World countries. Though only about one-
third the U.S. total and just over one-fourth that of the U.S.S.R., French totals
were twice those of her nearest competitor, the United Kingdom [Ref. 47:p.
1991.
Other statistics tend to qualify the impression conveyed by these facts.
however. For one thing, the Iran-Iraq war participants accounted for 22 percent
of French arms exports between 1982-1986 [Ref. 4:p. 509]. With the lessening
A tensions the amount of arms transfers to these nations has plummeted. In
ansolute terms, French arms exports to the Third World dropped from 3.4
billion dollars in 1986 to 1.7 billion dollars in 1988 [Ref. 47:p. 198]. Jean-Guy
Branger, a deputy of the Defense Committee of the National Assembly. cites
three reasons behind this decline: drops in the revenue of traditional buyers; the
advent of new competitors and more aggressive traditional competitors; and
systemic weaknesses in the French arms sales system, including the obsolescence
of organizations such as SOFMA and SOFRESA [Ref. 48:p. 441.
Arms exports also play an essential role in maintaining a defense-industrial
base. Most French arms producers rely heavily on exports to stay in business:
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Dassault-Breguet (73% of turnover is export), Matra (70%), and Aerospatiale
(62%) are three examples [Ref. 24:p. 187]. During periods of a strong export
market maintaining an effective industrial base is simpler and less costly to the
individual nation, and the strategic choices regarding the maintenance of a
national defense-industrial base are relatively easy to consider. It is during
periods of a shrunken market and increased competition for arms sales that the
issue becomes even more urgent.
The French arms industry employs about 280,000 people, spread among
many firms. The largest arms employer is Aerospatiale with about 35,000
employees [Ref. 49:p.]. As most of the French arms industry is centered on
technologically advanced products, industry employees are among the more
highly educated members of society. If the market for arms exports continues to
shrink and fiscal contraints limit the domestic market, reductions in this work
force are inevitable. An example is the 1987 laying off of some Dassault
employees for the first time since World War II, principally due to lagging sales
and dismal future prospects [Ref. 50:p. A10].
Can other sectors of the the French economy absorb employees from the
arms industry? Beset with a national unemployment rate of 10.3% in 1988,
France might not be in an optimum position [Ref. 51:p. Al]. This concern is
evident in recent attempts to reform the national maker of guns and armored
vehicles, GIAT. As already noted, initiatives were limited and constrained due
to concerns about the overall effect of phasing out jobs. The educational level of
the average defense industry worker would probably tend to mitigate the effect
of a high national unemployment rate as laid-off workers in defense industries
tend to find work more easily due to their high amount of schooling.
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Research and development can be pursued by the government for both civil
and military purposes, or by the private sector. France commits a relatively low
level of gross domestic product (2.15%) toward reseach and development
compared to other advanced democratic nations [Ref. 46:p. 303]. The Eureka
proposal of April 1985 by President Mitterrand placed France in the forefront of
the move toward shared research and development in civilian high technological
areas [Ref. 4 6:p. 289].
A stronger non-military cooperative R&D base would affect the arms
industry. For instance, the limited amount of funds for Research and
Development is divided between civilian R&D and military R&D, with emphasis
on the former. Though it could be argued that finding military uses for civilian
technology would be easier than the other way around, the arms industry be hard
hit by moves to place even greater emphasis on civilian R&D. The R&D effort
by the French government in space technology is an example of an effort with
civilian and military applications.
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III. THE BRITISH ARMS INDUSTRY
A. OVERVIEW OF THE BRITISH ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY
Like the French, the British attach great importance to a national arms
industry. Traditional British expertise in the areas of shipbuilding and aircraft
production is well documented, and these strengths were developed with the
active support of the British government. However, the central concept of state
involvement is not present in the United Kingdom to the same degree as in
France.
If one were to summarize the traditional aspects of the British armaments
industry, three points of emphasis would stand out. One is the close relationship
between the leaders of industry and government, resulting from a common elitist
upbringing. Secondly, private firms have played pivotal roles in boosting
production in times of crises, filling the gap left by the limited capability of
government-run arsenals and shipyards. Finally, no distinct procurement
strategy exists that clearly articulates the government's commitment toward the
maintenance of a national defense-industrial base.
The class system in Great Britain has limited the size of the talent pool from
which most government leaders have come. From this same pool has emerged
many of the leaders of British industry. The criteria for membership in such an
elite has included family status and common educational background [Ref. 52:p.
81, Leaders in both government and industry, therefore. have been steeped in the
traditions, values, and moral standards of certain sectors of British society.
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The crossover from positions of leadership in military service to high-level
positions in the arms industry is fairly common and accepted [Ref. 52:p. 221.
Personal contacts made while in the military are magnified in importance in the
British system, where a large amount of business is done through whom one
knows. The unspoken emphasis on tradition, personal honor, and the
gentleman's code is still present today. The addition of military men to the
corporate structure of the arms industry results in an increased ability to foresee
the changing equipment needs of armed forces, both in Great Britain and the rest
of the world.
The backbone of British industry has always been privately owned firms. In
the fields of technology where a commercial parallel existed, a private firm
could stay in business without government support, and thus be available when
needed for defense purposes. The best examples of this are the private shipyards
prevalent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, firms such as Vickers,
Armstrong's, and Scott's.
As long as a commercial market existed and the firm remained innovative.
government involvement in order to assure the firm's availability in time of war
was not necessary. Given the common convictions regarding the nation held by
leaders in industry and government, maximum benefit could be derived from
minimal government expenditure.
Government involvement increased in the early twentieth century in order to
maintain a capability in weapons technology that exports alone could not sustain.
An example is the subsidy to Vickers after World War I by the British
Admiralty in order to keep turret production capability intact during the low
shipbuilding period [Ref. 52:p. 15]. With tile rearmament of the armed force,
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starting in 1934 and accelerating through World War II many firms became
reliant on government contracts to support the huge expansion brought about by
the increase in production.
This was especially true in the aerospace industry. After the war the
industry had entrenched itself as a major employer, but had no natural market
for its product. Rather than create an innovative marketing strategy and make
the necessary adjustments itself, the industry relied on government involvement.
As a result, major mergers were forced on the industry in 1960, creating the
British Aircraft Corporation and the Hawker Siddely group. In 1978, these two
groups were nationalized as the British Aerospace Corporation (after Hawker
Siddeley went bankrupt) [Ref. 52:p. 24].
Another symbol of government involvement was the creation of the National
Enterprise Board to oversee troubled companies [Ref. 52 :p. 27].
Another aspect of the arms industry in Great Britain is the general lack of
clear policy guidance regarding the maintenance of a defense-industrial base.
The maintenance of national arms industries is a specific aspect of French policy,
vet British leaders in the last ten years have been vague concerning the
importance of national armaments. Economic considerations led to both the
decision to develop the Nimrod early warning aircraft in the 1970's and the
subsequent decision in 1986 to scuttle the program, but the desire to maintain an
industrial base for security reasons was not a major reason. According to
Trevor Taylor and Keith Hayward, the Conservative governments led by
Margaret Thatcher have shown more concern about getting better prices for
defense equipment than about maintaining and strengthening the national defense-
industrial base. The Government has stated a preference for domestic supplier,;
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in terms of jobs and foreign exchange benefits, but has not indicated a desire to
pay a premium for it [Ref. 53:p. 54].
B. BRITISH ARMS AS A POLITICAL TOOL
The British political system is dominated by two major political parties, the
Conservative Party and the Labour Party. Under the leadership of Margaret
Thatcher the Conservative Party has controlled the national government since
1979. As a result, the Conservative approach has shaped the use of the British
arms industry as a political tool over the past ten years. In the elections of 1983
and 1987 defense-related issues played an important role in the Labour defeat, so
a look at relevant Labour positions during these elections will show a clear
picture of what the electorate rejected. Those with implications for this study
are the Trident issue and the unilateralist stance, and the traditional Labour view
of state control of major industries.
The most visible difference between Conservative and Labour defense
platforms during the last decade has been the role of nuclear forces in the
defense of Britain. If elected, the Labour Party promised to abolish Britain's
nuclear arsenal, including Trident missiles and their platforms, while making a
stronger comnitment to conventional capabilities [Ref. 54:p. 51. Though the
issue itself was the cause of many votes cast for the Conservatives, the areas with
the greatest swing of support away from Labour were those constituencies with
defense factories or installations. Martin Holmes points out that the traditional
safe Labour seat of Barrow and Furness was won by the Conservatives, who
exploited Labour's commitment to cancel the Trident submarines manufactured
in that district [Ref. 5 4 :p. 2]. This tends to support the view that the promise of
jobs, due to defense programs has some effect on voting preference.
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Unilateralism would result in nuclear disarmament and the removal of
American nuclear weapons from British soil. Though the Labour Party
manifesto of 1987 called for unilateralism, it was proclaimed as a policy "based
squarely on membership of NATO." [Ref. 54:p. vii] The long-term consequence
of a unilateralist approach for a medium-sized power such as Britain might be
neutralism, however. Such a situation would have obvious ramifications for the
arms industry.
Traditionally, a basic tenet of Labour philosophy has been the flourishing of
many state-controlled firms. In such a way the government could directly
influence employment and prices, even at the expense of profit and the free
market. In 1979-1986 the Thatcher government sold over a dozen state-owned
companies to the private sector, including its 48.43% stake in British Aerospace
in 1985 [Ref. 55:p. 351. Labour indicated that some of the companies would be
renationalized if Labour returned to power. Two other defense-related firms
this might affect were Rolls Royce and Royal Ordnance [Ref. 56:p. 341.
In addition to stopping the trend of privatization, the Labour Party would
not have supported substantive moves toward a free market economy, as the
Conservatives have steadily done. In 1985-86, for instance, the British
government allowed more than 29 billion dollars in takeovers, over 4 times the
ty, pical annual amount during the early 80's [Ref. 57:p. 28]. In the defense
industry this policy resulted in the purchase of state-run Royal Ordnance by
British Aerospace in 1987 [Ref. 58:p. 27]. The Labour loss could be seen as a
mandate to Thatcher to continue her free market approach toward industry.
After the 1987 election Labour amended some of its defense policies,
including a move away from unilateralism toward multilateral nuclear
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disarmament. Concerning overall defense-industrial policy, Shadow Spokesman
for Defense Martin O'Neill charges that Government has failed to take adequate
action in anticipation of 1992. He stated in a recent interview, "The government
seems to be indifferent to the UK's industrial structure." [Ref. 59:p. 707]
What Labour has described as indifference is actually the evolution of a
relatively laissez-faire approach toward industry started by t'e Thatcher
government upon taking power in 1979. In general the Government is reluctant
to become involved in directing industrial development, believing exposure to
market pressures will result in growth and recovery [Ref. 60:p. 51].
At the same time defense procurement fell under a simple philosophy: better
value for the money. The economic implications for defense will be discussed
later, but foreign policy issues have been affected as well. Three examples show
that the government's relationship with British defense industry has political
ramifications: the Westland affair in 1985-86, the Nimrod controversy ending in
1986, and the saga of GEC/Plessey, finally resolved in 1989.
Westland PLC, Great Britain's only helicopter maker, was in need of
financial restructuring when in 1985 it was courted by the team of United
Technologies of the U.S. and Fiat S.p.A of Italy. The Ministry of Trade and
Industry supported this plan, which would have opened the European helicopter
market up to the Americans, and felt the result would be a stronger
infrastructure for further U.K./U.S. cooperation [Ref. 61:p. 32].
The Ministry of Defense, along with the defense ministries of the other
European helicoptor-producing nations, saw many reasons to reject this bailout
proposal in favor of one made hastily by a consortium of European defense
companies made up of Aerospatiale, Agusta of Italy, Messerschmitt-Boelko,-
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Blohm, and British Aerospace and British General Electric Co.. For one thing,
it was thought that the United Technologies role would cause Westland design
expertise to decay, thus losing a national defense capability. For another, in the
words of Sir John Cuckney, Westland's chairman, "There's been a major anti-
American motive in all of this to keep United Technologies out of the European
market. But it isn't up to our company to do what is best for one industry or
another." [Ref. 62:p. 24]
In the end the Thatcher government allowed Westland to choose United
Technologies. Trade and Industry Minister Leon Brittan made a statement
concluding that "it is for Westland to decide the best route to follow." [Ref. 63:p.
36] However, the controversy was so great that Michael Heseltine, the Minister
of Defense, resigned to protest the government having not chosen the European
solution. In his view, picking the European consortium would have supported
the policy of increased British involvement in European affairs. As Heseltine
stated in resigning:
It was recognized that with a Sikorsky shareholding Westland might tend to
become little more than a production facility for Sikorsky and to lose its
own helicopter design and development capacity, that a link with European
companies would fit better into the developing pattern of European
collaboration and that, in many ways, British Aerospace would be the most
welcome partner. [Ref. 64:p. 83]
The decision to produce the unproven Nimrod airborne warning aircraft as
opposed to Boeing's AWACS was made by the then Labour-led government in
1977. In addition to maintaining and developing national security technology for
potential export, the reason most often cited for this decision was the number of
British jobs that would be created as a result of this work. "The decision to go
for Nimrod here was a decision to maintain jobs and keep strategic industries."
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stated Malcolm Spaven of Sussex University's Armament and Di irmament
Information Unit [Ref. 65:p. 36].
British GEC and British Aerospace never succeeded with initial prototypes,
and a decision was needed in 1986 whether to continue the program with no
assurance of ultimate completion or whether to purchase the NATO-integrated
Boeing AWACS. Though pressured by industrialists, union leaders, and the
Labour Party, the Thatcher government chose the Boeing AWACS, citing
security reasons [Ref. 66:p. 27]. In response to concerns about the loss of jobs
and high technology expertise, the United Kingdom entered into an offset
agreement with Boeing that called for Boeing to provide work over eight years
valued at 130% of the value of the contract, approximately 1.3 billion dollars
[Ref. 67:p. 36]. When the first UK AWACS was rolled out in July 1989 the level
of contracts won up until that time by UK companies was announced as 624
million dollars [Ref. 68:p. 44].
Thus in the same year as the Westland affair, in which the Thatcher
government was endangered by a controversial decision seeming to favor the
United States, but in which only political and economic issues were ,ignificantly
addressed, the decision regarding the fate of Nimrod was made. In contrast to
the Westland decision, which was mainly a political one, the longer Nimrod was
delayed the longer the United Kingdom had to rely on an ineffective air defense
warning system in its portion of European airspace to protect [Ref. 6 5 :p. 36]. In
other words, the decision to rely on AWACS instead of Nimrod was heavily
influenced by security considerations.
The saga of GEC and Plessey began with GEC's hostile takeover bid in 1986.
GIC offered to take over Plessey for 1.77 billion dollars. Plessey, labor unions.
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and some members of Parliament claimed a takeover by GEC would create a
near-monopoly of the national defense electronics industry, amrr.,_, -', .;rs.
Critics of the GEC takeover bid also pointed out to Plessey stockholders the fact
that GEC had failed in its Nimrod venture, while Plessey was a subcontractor for
the American makers of AWACS [Ref. 69:p. 181. This bid was disallowed after
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission completed a six-month study in July
1986 [Ref. 70:p. 20].
In November 1988 another takeover offer was announced for Plessey from
GEC and Siemens of West Germany, an attempt that was cleared by both the
British government and the European Community prior to consummation.
Certain safeguards were insisted on by the government in the area of defense,
including the requirement that all top executives of Plessey's defense-related
businesses be British citizens [Ref. 71:p. AS]. The acceptance of the deal by the
Monopoly and Mergers Commission seems to have signaled the start of a trend
which may result in more foreign ownership of British firms dealing with
defense. Also, though the deal might have been blocked on security grounds
alone in times past, the importance of the economic benefits in the civil sector of
the pooling of semiconductor and telecommunications interests outweighed
security aspects [Ref. 72:p. 1].
During the Thatcher years the arms industry has been used to support
foreign policy objectives through the use of arms exports. Often with the Prime
Minister personally involved in the promoting of British arms, the export trade
has increased steadily through the 1980's, in many cases solidifyilg traditional
relationships with other nations such as Saudi Arabia [Ref. 73:p. 251.
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Perhaps the clearest case of the arms industry being used to support foreign
policy objectives has been the refusal of the British government to allow arms
sales to Iraq and Iran since 1984. Even though a cease fire was agreed to in July
1988, the government apparently will review its policy only when a formal truce
is declared. For instance, in July 1989 a committee of the British cabinet
blocked a proposed sale of Hawk trainer aircraft by British Aerospace to Iraq,
though the potential consequences included losing the salc to Dassault-Breguet of
France and Dornier of West Germany. Though both the Ministry of Defense
and the Department of Trade and Industry supported British Aerospace's
proposal, the Foreign Office was strongly opposed, as it went against British
foreign policy [Ref. 74:p. 1].
C. BRITISH ARMS AS A SECURITY TOOL
Unlike France, whose independent arms industry has supported an
independent defense policy, Britain's defense-industrial complex was never
designed to fulfill all its defense needs [Ref. 60:p. 521. This contrast is best
highlighted by the different approach taken by Britain in the development of an
independent national nuclear deteirent. Whereas France invested significant
national assets toward this goal, the British have since 1962 relied almost
completely on the United States for the necessary technology. The intent to build
a nuclear arsenal indicates that Great Britain, like France, desires major power
status: the method of reliance on foreign sources indicated Britain's willingness,
unlike France, to place nuclear security interests in the hands of allies.
Security to Great Britain has always included a strong navy and the right mix
of continental allies. The capability to build ships has been a British tradition
and cortinues to this day. The market for large warships is confined to domestic
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buyers, i.e., the government, with a potential export market limited to less
sophisticated vessels [Ref. 75:p. 454].
An interesting situation exists: whereas the arms export aspect of most
defense industries allows for the maintenance of a national industrial base, in the
area of shipbuilding the makers of exportable craft are differert from the
makers of domestically-needed warships. A thriving export business, in other
words, does not guarantee a continued ability to build large ,hips for the British
navy. The main reason behind the capability to build big ships is to support
national security goals.
This has resulted in less competitive criteria applied in the warship
construction business by the government than in other defense manufacturing
industries [Ref. 60:p. 53]. For example, Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering,
especially since acquiring the Cammell Laird shipbuilding firm, plays the
dominant role in submarine construction. The firm of Swan Hunter dominates
on large ships, and the firm of Yarrow for frigates. This is in contrast to the
rest of the military shipbuilding business, where approximately nineteen
shipbuilding concerns compete for domestic and foreign contracts for ships such
as patrol craft and minesweepers [Ref. 75:p. 462].
The traditional importance of the right mix of continental allies for security
policy has in the post-World War I1 environment been embodied by NATO. In
fact, unlike tile French, who call their own nuclear deterrence capability the
cornerstone of their security policy, the British openly acknow'edge NATO as
the keystone of their defense IRef. 76:p. 3]. In the alliance the United Kingdom
has a role in the mobilization of defense forces, but not tile all-encompassing one
it Would have without an alliance network.
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British out-of-area commitments include garrisons in the Falklands, Hong
Kong, Belize, Brunei, and Cyprus. Other commitments are met with the fleet in
overseas locations such as the Indian Ocean. However, two justifications for this
committment point to the overall precedence of NATO: low relative cost and the
ability to return to the NATO area on short notice [Ref. 76:p. 3].
D. BRITISH ARMS AS AN ECONOMIC TOOL
The exporting of arms is often a way for a nation to afford a broad defense-
industrial base. In France this has been so, but in Britain it is somewhat less
important. The main impetus for the importance placed on arms exports in
Britain seems to be the desire for a positive trade balance, and arms represent
one of the more effective ways to accomplish it. Between 1984 and 1988 the
United Kingdom exported 8.8 billion dollars worth of major weapons, 58
percent of them to five nations of traditional British involvement: India,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Oman, and Saudi Arabia [Ref. 47:p. 196]. The
overwhelming majority of British arms exports in the latter years of the 1980's
went to the Third World, being passed up in exports to the industrial world in
1988 by nations such as Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and the Netherlands [Ref. 47:p.
1981.
With such an emphasis on Third World arms sales the British could have
trouble maintaining export levels as these nations become constrained
economically in purchasing major weapons. In addition, weapons such as the
Tornado tactical aircraft and the Challenger tank have limitations as potential
exports. the Tornado from premature aging and the Challenger from
inappropriatc design [Ref. 7 7 :p. 1861. Thus, due to the likely prospect of
decreasinim arms sales in their traditional market, Britain will need to shift its
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focus toward its European and American allies in order to maintain a positive
arms trade flow. Rather than outright sales of weapons as with Third World
clients, this will mean an increase in cooperative projects.
The major governmental support organization for the arms export industry
is the Defence Export Services Organization. Its role is to coordinate
government support for major sales, to provide market surveys, to analyse the
potential market for new products, and to ensure that specifications for new
equipment take into account export potential [Ref. 76:p. 33]. The nature of the
organization, possibly due to the overall government policy of free market
emphasis, does not seem to hinder any movement toward cooperation with other
governments, as the societies in France seem to do.
An aspect of the use of the arms industry as an economic tool that is very
much a trait of the Thatcher government is the announced procurement policy of
"value for money". In the words of the Defense Ministry:
Our procurement policies aim to obtain for the armed forces the equipment
they need, when they need it and with the best value for our money'.
Competition is at the heart of our strategy and it can only succeed if as
many companies as possible know about, and compete for, our business.. .B.
adopting a commercial approach to procurement and exposing the defence
industry to market forces, we have encouraged an enterprising industrial
base that actively seeks new ideas and efficiency in the use of resources.
[Ref. 76:p. 29]
The reforms which brought about this policy were known as the Levene
reforms, named after Sir Peter Levene, appointed Chief of Defence Procurement
in the Ministry of Defence in 1985.
Though designed to increase the efficiency of the British arms industry,
certain implications of this policy are not fully supported in Britain. These deal
with potential foreign influence. For one thing, the issue is often seen as whether
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to buy British, irrespective of cost, or to purchase more economical equipment
from abroad. In a recent poll of a random sample of 100 Members of
Parliament, 57% of the Conservatives polled were in favor of preferential
treatment for British companies on procurement issues, while 97% of Labour
MPs supported the idea of preferential treatment. The two major reasons given
were domestic employment and national pride [Ref. 78:p. 35].
Potential foreign influence could also come in a more indirect way than
through equipment procurement. In 1983 the Adam Smith Institute published a
report on defense policy called the Omega Report on Defense Policy, in which
four principles of defense programming were presented. They were the
principles of efficiency, competition, choice and substitution. Since 1983 the
first two principles have been undertaken: the principle of efficiency manifested
by the procurement policy geared to more value for the money; the principle of
competition manifested by the privatization of state-owned enterprises [Ref. 54 :p.
381.
The principle of ch)ice would call for Britain to reassess its roles as a
maritime power with force-in-being commitments in the Federal Republic of
Germany, and as a nuclear power with a need for substantial conventional forces.
And finally, the principle of substitution would call for the civilianization of
certain military functions by the substitution of non-military items and services
for military ones. Use of the civilian sector, for example, in areas of troop
transportation, food preparation, and medical services are examples of the
principle of substitution.
Taken to the extreme, the policy being pursued by the Thatcher government
could incorporate all these principles and open the door to foreign intervention.
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As described by Christopher Coker, the Daily Telegraph imagined a potential
Thatcherite military policy: It reported the government was considering de-
nationalizing the army and selling off parts of it. "Strict flotation terms," the
paper wrote, "would prevent hostile foreign interests gaining majority control..."
[Ref. 79:p. 17].
IV. THE WEST GERMAN ARMS INDUSTRY
A. OVERVIEW OF THE WEST GERMAN ARMAMENTS
INDUSTRY
Two overwhelming facts have distinguished the German armaments industry
from its French and British counterparts. First, the German state was defeated
in two major wars this century, the second of which resulted in the division of
Germany into two separate political entities. In both wars Germany was the
aggressor nation. Second, unlike France and Britain, the Federal Republic of
Germany had no track record from these wars as a reliable ally to the other
powers that made up post-World War II Europe. An overview of the Federal
Republic's armaments industry must center on these two points.
Whereas the underlying justification for both France and Britain to activl'
support an ambitious armaments program is their position as sovereign and
accepted world players, the justification for a national arms industry in the
Federal Republic of Germany is much less clear. Nowhere as in the area of
security has West Germany had to tread more carefully due to Germany's
history as a belligerent, expansionist nation. The development of a complete and
independent defense-industrial base in West Germany after World War II was
unthinkable, though much of European post-war politics was centered around the
question of rearming West Germany using the weapons base of the occupying
powers, specifically the United States.
When the Bundeswehr was established in 1955, it was armed using mostly
American weapons, not those of German origin. In fact, under the terms of the
Western European Union the Federal Republic was prohibited from the
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manufacture of any weapons judged to have an offensive character [Ref. 80:p.
2901. As the Federal Republic proved its reliability as an ally in the ensuing
years these restrictions gradually were taken away, with the exception of a ban
on producing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons [Ref. 80:p. 290].
Establishing itsclf as a reliable ally has been a two step effort by West Germany.
First, almost all national security policy issues have been approached from an
alliance perspective. This is in direct contrast to France, whose desire for
autonomous powers was a reason for that nation le-',ing t,e integrated military
structure of NATO in 1966. In describing the mission of the Bundeswehr the
1985 White Paper on defense stated
The Bundeswehr has been conceived as an army in the Alliance and not as
an instrument for independent military power projection on the part of the
Federal Republic of Germany. It can accomplish its mission only within the
framework of the Alliance. [Ref. 81:p. 72]
The West German government is prone to have this perspective when it comes to
procurement issues as well.
With the fear of German revanchism in the subconscious of her allies, the
Federal Republic has taken a second step toward allaying those fears in her
attempt to establish herself as a reliable ally. In two areas prominent since
World War II as manifestations of military power, nuclear weapons and large
armaments capability, West German policy is geared toward seeking no nuclear
weapons on the one hand and toward cooperative weapons projects one the other.
The result of the imposed restriction on manufacturing arms by the Western
European Union treaty in 1954 and of the self-imposed restriction on developing
an independent defense-industrial base has been an increased desire to purchase
directly from others or collaborate in projects with other weapons producers.
55
Initially the weapons manufacturers to gain the most from this concept were the
Americans, usually through the direct purchase of weapons.
Through the years, however, the Federal Republic has frequently turned to
its West European neighbors for co-development of different systems, not just to
produce weapons systems but to erase its "pariah" image while re-establishing
defense-industrial independence [Ref. 40:p. 11]. In addition, West Germany has
used cooperative ventures to develop closer ties to France, even at the expense of
military efficiency and capability [Ref. 40:p. 11].
West Germany's effort to establish itself as a reliable ally has been
successful. With the lessening of pressure brought about by this concern, West
German defense policy has had to reflect a wider range of national interests.
Josef Joffe cites three factors that have conditioned these wider interests. First.
the Germans have realized that the United States is limited in its ability to
provide more than the mainstays of European security, such as monetary
stability, secure oil supplies, and political order in troubled areas. Second, as the
Federal Republic improved relations with its East European neighbors under the
policy of Ostpolitik, its dependence on the West for foreign policy guidance
decreased. And finally, these improved relations have resulted in a whole new
set of interests, above and beyond those of the Alliance [Ref. 82:p. 90].
As interests have expanded beyond those of the Alliance, new reasons for
establishing an armaments base in the Federal Republic of Germany have
developed, somewhat more along the traditional lines of France and the United
Kingdom. However, the foundation behind the development of the West German
arni industry will always differ fundamentally from that of its allies.
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B. WEST GERMAN ARMS AS A POLITICAL TOOL
Like any other aspect of German society that has militaristic undertones, the
West German arms industry is not utilized in political circles as a rallying point
of national pride. This is true in both domestic and foreign policy issues.
Domestically, the people of Germany have typically become involved in defense
issues only as it related to a heightened public awareness of environmental issues
starting in the mid-1970's. National foreign policy has been consistently non-
belligerent, and West German governments have, in the words of Catherine
McArdle Kelleher, taken great pains to "avoid unnecessary symbols of national
independence." [Ref. 80:p. 290]
The debate on security issues had been limited to a small circle of experts
and interested parties until the growing concern about nuclear weapons became a
political issue in the late 1970's. The neutron weapon controversy in 1977, the
NATO dual-track decision in 1979 which resulted in the planned stationing of
108 Pershing II and 96 ground launched cruise missiles on German soil, and the
American decision to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983 all resulted
in an increase in public awareness and concern [Ref. 83:pp. 43-51]. Desire for
continued peace and environmental concerns were the dominant attitudcs, so
there was little political impetus for making an issue out of the role of the arms
industry.
The involvement in the German arms industry of two strong groups make it
all the more likely that the industry will not become the center of a political
issue. These are the labor unions and the German banks. For one thing, labor
unions are strong, organized, and resistant to long-term reform if short-term
effccts are lower cnployment and employee relocation. Potentially controversial
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decisions involving change in the industry are watered down in the corporate
boardroom, where labor unions are represented [Ref. 84:p. 20]. The net result is
a limit on government's ability to shape the tuture appearance of the arms
industry.
Other players in German industry with major influence are the German
banks, which are not only involved in the financing but in the running of
companies as well. As an example, the Deutsche Bank has officers or directors
on 59 of the top 100 German firms; other banks have similar attributes [Ref.
85:p. 321. The result, of course, is significant influence by the nation's financial
institutions in the determination of the strategies of arms makers, often
superceding the role of the government. Many credit the power of the German
banks as the main reason for the stability and growth of the West German
economy, so the presence of such institutions makes it less likely the government
would get heavily involved in the industry, making a political issue out of arms
production.
The export of arms is very restricted in West Germany.* In fact, prior to
1982 an export ban was imposed on all nations considered to be in conflict with
another country [Ref. 86:p. 147]. This resulted in a relatively small amount of
annual arms exports, so that prior to 1982 arms exports accounted for about
0.5-% of overall German exports. The Schmidt government eased off somewhat
For different views of the West German arms export policy, see Pearson,
F. S., "Necessary Evil: Perspective of West German Arms Transfer Policy,"
Armed Forces and Societv, Summer 1986, pp. 525-552, and Brzoska, k., "The
Erosion of Restraint in West German Arms Transfer Policy," Journal f Peac
Research, May 1989, pp. 165-78.
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from this policy in 1982, allowing sales to belligerents if such sales were deemed
to be "in the vital interests of the Federal Republic of Germany." [Ref. 87:p. 27]
Arms exports, howevzr, are still reviewed by the executive branch on a case-
by-case basis. Maintaining such control but with more flexibility has resulted in
an increased use of the arms export industry as a tool to support West Germany's
strategic interests. The use of arms exports in this way by the Kohl government
has resulted in much criticism from the principal opposition party, the Social
Democrats, who have called for the restriction of arms exports to only the 24
democracies who make up the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development [Ref. 88:p. 17]. Nations buying arms from the Federal Republic
must take into consideration the fact that follow-on sales and upgrades are not
automatic.
Another effect of this policy has been on joint ventures with France and
Britain. As stated before, the government has used cooperative arms production
in support of a policy aimed at establishing the Republic as a faithful ally while
allaying fears of revanchism. In addition, German involvement in these projects
has increased the nation's production capability and broadened its technological
base. However, as the exporting of arms became more important to France and
Britain the restrictive attitude of West Germany threatened to hamper future
collaborative efforts.
As an example, in 1982 the Schmidt government rejected a request to export
the Tornado aircraft to Saudi Arabia. The memorandum of understanding
creating the Panavia consortium which built the Tornado included veto power by
each of the member countries of Italy, Great Britain, and West Germany on the
matter of exports. In 1968, \when the formation of Panavia was agreed to by the
59
participants, the prospects of exporting the Tornado were not considered a vital
aspect of the program [Ref. 2:pp. 46-50]. However, in the 1980's exports were
vital to the success of large weapons programs, and after taking office
Chancellor Kohl allowed an amendment proposed by the British to eliminate the
veto power for Tornado export to become policy [Ref. 87:p. 28]. Soon
thereafter the British concluded a deal with Saudi Arabia and Oman for Tornado
export. This indicates the willingness of the Federal iepublic to modify its
stance on export restrictions in cases where collaborative projects are involved.
The resolutions adopted by the Party Conference of the Social Democratic
Party of Germany in August 1986 include a de-emphasis on the armaments
industry. As part of the steps necessary for the further development of the
Bundeswehr,
The SPD calls upon firms in the armaments industry to reduce their
dependence on weapons contracts. In particularly difficult cases the), can be
granted assistance in switching over to the manufacture of civilian products
in order to safeguard jobs. An SPD-led government will establish a
foundation for the conversion of the armaments industry and introduce a
public investment programme to encourage the production of civilian goods
by companies cuTently manufacturing weapons [Ref. 88:p. 181.
The potential implications for further cooperative involvement seem clearly
negative under the prospects of a SPD-ied government, though enactment of
these aspects of the SPD platform is by no means assured.
C. WEST GERMAN ARMS AS A SECURITY TOOL
From the beginnings of the Bundeswehr in 1955 a need for some arms was
present in the Federal Republic of Germany. The rapid rearmament of the
armed forces using mostly American weapons not only created a habit of buying
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U.S. weapons systems, it took away a basic reason for developing a national
armaments industry: to outfit that nation's armed forces.
The role of allies (especially the United States) in the West German defense
strategy is vitally important. Through the outstretching of the nuclear umbrella
and the presence of 300,000 of its troops the United States has committed its
power to defed the Federal Republic. As long as that power is committed, the
Federal Republic of Germany is defended as well as its strategy could have
hoped. Only when a constraint or policy shift emerges in the U.S. that might
affect American support and commitment would West German security
potentially suffer. Thus, West German effort should go toward ensuring that no
such policy shift occurs.
The West German procurement process could support these alliance-
maintenance efforts in two ways. First, by buying American weapons West
Germany could help offset the U.S. cost of maintaining troops in the Federal
Republic, thus removing a potential economic constraint. Second, buying
weapons from the United States would ensure that an independent arms capability
does not develop, a capability that would risk a shift in U.S. policy toward a
European defense framework with less U.S. ties, as American perceptions of
West Germany being able to defend itself increased IRef. 891.
The point of this reasoning is not that a national armaments capability has no
place in West Germany, but that its role is not as vital to its national security
goals as the armaments industry is to either Britain or France. As Andrew
Moravcsik has pointed out, domestic sources made up 80% and 75% of French
and British procurement, respectively, between 1985-1989, whereas purely
domestic sources only made up 45; of West German procurement during that
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same time period [Ref. 5:p. 66]. It is the maintenance of the alliance that has
been vital to West German security, and the role of the arms industry has been as
a supporter of the Alliance, not as an independent national source of weapons.
D. WEST GERMAN ARMS AS AN ECONOMIC TOOL
The need to afford a broad defense-industrial base is not a by-product of the
national strategy of the Federal Republic of Germany, as it is in the case of
France. The use of the armament industry to provide for a positive trade
balance is minimal, much less so than ii. the United Kingdom. Military research
and development represents a small pe""on of the total amount of R&D done in
the country, much less than in France and Britain but not as small as in Japan
[Ref. 46:p. 303]. The absolute values of West German arms exports, however,
have grown significantly in the past decade, and recent trends in industrial
takeovers have provided West Germany with some defense firms as big as any, in
Europe [Ref. 90:p. 11. These two aspects make the arms industry an economic
tool of large potential.
Arms exports prior to the 1980's mostly concentrated on sales to NATO
allies, reflecting the government's policy of refusing to authorize sales to nations
in armed conflict (the nations most likely to want to purchase arms). Meanwhile,
cooperative ventures took place wi'h NATO allies, both co-development projects
and co-production projects. Through both the Federal Republic gained the
technology and know-how to independently develop weapons systems.
The ability to make weapons suitable for export was developed before any
easing of export restrictions, so when the easing came in 1982, the capability was
already there. The nct result was an increase in exports, most dramatically to the
Third \\orld. In the ycars 1976-1980 the FeJeral Republic exported S1.07
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billion worth of arms to the Third World (constant 1985 prices), much less than
the $4.66 billion during 1981-1985 [Ref. 47:p. 228]. Combined with a still-
strong market in the industrialized world, West German arms exports represent
between 3 and 4 percent of total world sales, comparable to Britain but less than
France.
The shape of the arms industry has changed as a result of the increase in
importance of different economic factors, not hindered by any pronounced need
to maintain the status quo. The clearest example is that of the restructuring of
the defense industry caused by the Daimler-Benz takeover of Messerschmidt-
Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) in 1989. MBB is a major defense contractor involved in
such multi-national projects as Tornado and EFA (multi-role combat aircraft).
Trigat (third generation anti-tank missile), and the PAH/HAC (anti-tank
helicopter), as well as national endeavors such as the main battle tank Leopard II
(through its interest in Krauss-Maffei). Daimler-Benz is a corporate giant which
generated over $37 billion in sales in 1988, though less than 10 percent due to
arms sales [Ref. 91:p. 29]. The combination of governmental support, a clear
corporate strategy by Daimler-Benz, and common sense make this deal a
potential model for the future.
The eovernment desired this deal for several reasons, even though such a
corporate joining would create a virtual monopoly on domestic defense
equipment for Daimler. For one thing, the government felt it necessar, to
discontinue its polic' of subsidizing the European Airbus project, not only for
hudget considerations but also to send a signal to the United States, which has
complatined heavilV about subsidies for the civilian airline program [Ref. 92:p.
2l ] Scc~ndlv. th,: consolidation of NIb13 and Dornier (part of the l)aimler
11), sconl\ th cosold~tlo ofM63
empire) is considered an important step in the government's desire to concentrate
major firms in the West German air and space sector into an efficient national
industry [Ref. 91:p. 29]. Finally, the financial strength and overall size of
Daimlcr-Benz ensures German participation in international defense projects will
be given equal status with any potential group of partners, including those of the
United States.
Certain concessions were demanded of, and agreed to by, Daimler Benz
before the takeover was allowed. Partly to appease the concerns of the Federal
Cartel Office, which objected to the takeover on the grounds that it would create
a monopoly in the defense sector [Ref. 93:p. A10]. West German Economics
Minister Helmut Haussmann attached the following conditions to the sale:
* Daimler must sell MBB's share of Krauss-Maffei AG, maker of Leopard
tanks.
• Daimler must sell the naval warfare, torpedo, and drone technology
divisions of AEG and MBB.
* Daimler and MBB must divest themselves of several firms that advise the
government on military procurement.
* Daimler and MBB executives must resign from the supervisory boards of
companies that are important military suppliers.
* Daimler must take over all of Deutsche Airbus GmbH by the end of 1996,
including the share held by the government. [Ref. 94:p. 321
The government's willingness to accept a situation where a privately-held
company would hold virtually total control over the domestic arms industry.
even with these conditions, is in direct contrast with France and even more free-
market-oriented than the privatization efforts of the Thatcher government.
The acquisition of MBB follows a pattern of takeovers by Daimler-Benz
started iri 1985 with the absorption of all of the diesel and jet engine maker
.ot(ren -u nd - Tu rin -Union, 56%,C of AEG (electronics), and 65.5 '(; of
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Dornier (aerospace) [Ref. 95:p. 1205]. The components of this strategy come in
three parts. First, with the development of an internal European market in 1992
Daimler recognized the importance of having a broad-based corporation if
multi-national project leadership was desired [Ref. 96:p. 367]. Second, by its
recent acquisitions Daimler has positioned itself to take advantage of the trend in
both defense and civilian markets toward increased emphasis on electronics and
high technology areas. Finally, the takeover of MBB has gotten Daimler
involved in the major European joint projects at the contractor level, a better
position to wield influence and take advantage of its economic strength.
Common sense has also been allowed to play a role in the Daimler/MBB
deal. In the future of major weapons development, only large firms will be able
to compete in the world market, so the forming of a huge conglomerate made up
of national firms is the next logical step in ensuring survival in the arms
industry. The Dornier/MBB combination is also natural, as Dornier in
particular was too small to compete effectively in the changing world market*
The use of a common structure that combined operations allows for will increase
efficiency of development and production.
The civilianization that a firm like Daimler-Benz brings to the world of arms
production is also essential to the future survival of weapons making capability.
The heavy involvement ii, non-military business ensures Daimler-Benz's lack of
dependence on a strong defense market, thus the ability to endure a soft market
without government support. This in turn allows a national government to
(apital for I)ornier is on the order of 10(0 million DNM. approximately 1/0 
thtt of %1BB. (source: lIera via, April 1988).
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The French armaments industry is used extensively for political, security,
and economic purposes. The dominant factors are the national desire for
strategic independence and the role of the State in ensuring that the shape of the
arms industry supports that desire. As a political tool the arms industry affects
domestic policy as a source of employment and export earnings for French
citizens and foreign policy as a potential substitute for former methods of
influence such as troop presence and colonial rule.
The predominant feature of post-World War II French security policy has
been nuclear deterrence. A trend toward reduced reliance on nuclear deterrence
has been evident in the Western Alliance over the last several years, allowing
France the opportunity to reassess the role of conventional armaments in her
security strategy. Because of this, an interesting possibility emerges involving
the French use of the arms industry as a security tool. If the dominance of
nuclear deterrence in French strategy were to erode, there might be more of a
need for a strong conventional defense-industrial base with less of a demand for
strategic independence. To strengthen that base most quickly. a strategy of
collaborative effort with other nations in Europe might be most effective.
To the French, arms exports represent a vital aspect of the industry'. A
decrease in exports would affect France more than either Britain or \Vest
GermaTy, not only because of the greater volume of export trade by France, but
al,,, because of the greater number of' workers supported b\ thewe exports.
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France has been reluctant to reform the infrastructures developed to support a
strong export market such as the sales societies and the DGA. The character of
these institutions may need to be modified for successful integration.
A summary of these conclusions and their applicability in the overall theory
is represented in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Integration Model as Applied to France
B. Tl1i. UNITED) KINGDOM1
A sunmri of conclusions involving Great Britain as they apply to tile
(werall tlleor\' is re presented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Integration Model as Applied to Great Britain
In the past ten years Britain under Thaitcher has follow~ed a policy in which
market forces have been allowed to influence the shape of heretofore protected
industries. Slowly, but steadily this has been evident in the arms industry.
Following a procurement policy of better value for the money, the British
government has not hindered the involvement of foreign firms in the making of
British weapons, including both L-uropean and American companies. ,As a
result, most arms decisions with a political undertone in Britaini would probably
be conducivc to ultimate11 integration.
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In issues of British security policy the importance of the proper allies stands
out as the most dominant. Arms projects of a cooperative nature tend to
strengthen alliance relationships, so would tend to facilitate European arms
integration if the partners were European. When the partner is American (as in
the Westland case), European integration may suffer.
Economically privatization efforts also support arms integration. As
weapons get more expensive to produce and the export market continues to
shrink, Britain becomes an attractive partner to other arms producers. In
contrast with French government involvement and German export restrictions,
the British efforts toward creating a free market in arms production appear
highly favorable for increased European integration.
C. WEST GERMANY
A summary of conclusions involving West Germany as they apply to the
overall theory is represented in Figure 6.
Two aspects of the analysis of West German national processes stand out as
especially significant with respect to European arms integration: Bonn's need
politically and militarily to establish its reliability as an ally; and the presence of
a prototypical "mega -firm" that seems to represent the wave of the industrial
future, Daimler-Benz. Both these facets of the industry represent a willingness
to integrate and even suggest a strategy for ultimate integration.
The success of West German security policy is based upon a strong Atlantic
Alliance not only due to the added defense capability it provides, but also because
of the opportunity it affords to prove the Federal Republic's reliability as an ally.
Arms exports, as another example, have always been restricted in order not to
pronote images of German "merchants of death." Though restrictions have been
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eased over the last decade, in a smaller market some types of German
salesmanship efforts might seem too aggressive to European neighbors, so an
increased emphasis on national arms sales may be seen as not supporting the
overall security objective. On the other hand, multilateral European arms
ventures could overcome these perceptual difficulties and promote greater
integration in European arms industries.
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Figure 7. Integration Model as Applied to West German'
Even before Daimler-Benz became part of the arms industry in the 1980s the
German companies involved in the production of weaponry seemed to have
relied less on defense trade for profits than either British or French firms. With
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the entrance of Daimler-Benz into the arms business it becomes clear that exports
are not necessary to sustain the West German arms industry, but that the
presence of a civilian giant does strengthen the industry's potential to cross
national lines more effectively as 1992 approaches. Infrastructures developed in
the civilian arena could be used to consolidate an integrated European arms
market.
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Suggested further steps utilizing the fruits of this research take two
particular forms. First, now that a theory has been presented, tracking arms
events and using them in this integration model will develop the database
necessary to gauge the level of integration. Second, the non-process factors,
assumed to be constant in this study, can be further refined with in-depth study.
In addition, events occur that call for not just refinement, bi t a basic change.
Though the results of this model are impressionistic, a development of a
database of arms events among France, Britain and West Germany can give a
quantitative feel for the extent and rate of integration to the analyst. Policies and
strategies can then be developed taking into account this information. As a
result, the integration of the European arms industry and its potential effects will
be anticipated.
Further refinement of non-process factors is necessaly for a more valid
model, certainly if a quantitative analysis is desired. What also must be
considered are recent changes in the world scene that may functionally affect the
global environment. Potentially the most important changes affecting the
European arms industry and resulting United States policy involve Eastern
Europe.
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The events in Eastern Europe in late 1989 were unexpected and their long-
term implications are far from clear. The overall effect on the European arms
industry may be far-reaching and may not be apparent in the near future, but a
general approach to research can be suggested in order to provide a framework
for analysis.
An analysis of the capabilities of the major Eastern European arms
producers, specifically Czechoslovakia, might show that arms cooperation,
notwithstanding the potentially significant political hurdles, could provide a basis
for a relatively equitable industrial relationship with western firms as well as a
source of hard currency for the newly-formed regimes. What level of
cooperation can be expected? How might the effective break-up of the Warsaw
Pact affect the prospects for European arms integration, considering both the
potential diminish presence of an enemy (the Warsaw Pact) and the
disappearance of the major ally (the prospective withdrawal of part of the U.S.
presence in Europe)?
For Americans, the major questions surrounding the events of the past
several months obviously concern prospects for strengthened international
security and strategic stability in Europe. It should be asked, however, whether
these events may make the prospect of an integrated European arms industry less
strategically significant to U.S. interests, though still important as an economic
challenge. The reverse may be the case: in a period of unpredictable and
potentially risky change, the United States needs to be able to rely on strong and
cohesive partners in Westcrn Europe.
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